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Summary 
The important place that British investments occupied in Cuba during the 1950s 
is reflected in the reports sent home by the ambassador. Having long complained 
of the low level of productivity, the British Ambassador supported Batista's coup 
of 1952 in the hope that the de facto government would use its position to 
reduce labour costs. The régime's use of repression and corruption to reduce the 
ability of organised labour to defend wages and conditions has not been 
generally studied, but this aspect of his dictatorship is evident from a reading of 
the British diplomatic reports, which show that it was central to the support that 
Batista received from local capital as well as from foreign business interests. In 
the year that sees the 50th anniversary of the Cuban revolution, this paper will 
examine the Batista régime and the insurrection against it from the point of view 
of the British Foreign Office and the business interests it represented. 
 
  
Introduction 
 
One of the main tasks of an ambassador is to advance the interests of British 
businesses in the country in which he or she is stationed, a responsibility that 
inevitably colours its view of local politics. Thus, in Cuba in the 1950s, a central 
concern of the British embassy was the rate of return on both Cuban and British 
capital investment. In the light of such preoccupations, this article will examine 
the British view of Cuba as seen through the lens of the diplomatic 
correspondence held in the National Archives at Kew and will argue that one of 
the main reasons that Batista received the support of local and foreign capital 
was because he was seen as the best prospect for increasing Cuban productivity. 
Thus, having long complained of the unreasonable demands of labour, the 
reports sent home by the British Ambassador warmly welcomed Batista's coup of 
1952 in the hope that the de facto government would use its position to reduce 
labour costs.  
 
 
Increasing profitability 
 
The régime's campaign of ‘intensivismo’ - the Cuban term for the use of 
repressive force and widespread corruption specifically to reduce the ability of 
organised labour to defend wages and conditions - is thereafter accepted by ‘Our 
Man in Havana’ as a necessary price to pay for increased profitability and the 
vague hope of rising prosperity. In particular, the corrupt nature of the 
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leadership of the Cuban trade unions is only seen to be a problem while they 
were opposed to wage and job cuts and is quickly forgotten in the light of their 
later moderation and support for the régime. As they became increasingly 
worried about the threat posed by the rebels in the mountains, the British 
Foreign Office did all in its power to support Batista, including the supply of tanks 
and warplanes, even after the United States had stopped openly doing so. 
However, once Batista had fled and despite private revulsion at the revolutionary 
government, British diplomacy quickly accustomed itself to the new reality and 
succeeded in gaining a commercial advantage over the US -, their cold war allies 
but commercial rivals.  
    
At the start of the 1950s, Cuba was in economic difficulties as worldwide sugar 
production exceeded demand and prices tumbled (Pino Santos 2008). Sugar was 
central to the Cuban economy and the slump in its international price badly 
affected every business on the island, causing the employers to feel the need for 
increased productivity. As one embassy report expressed it: 
 
"Many observers considered that the workers were receiving better 
treatment than the economy of the country could in the long term afford" 
(Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 
1906-1966, FO 371/103390 - AK2181/1) 
 
The report went on to record that Cuban workers were the highest paid in Latin 
America. However, to the majority of Cuban workers themselves, this merely 
seemed the normal state of affairs. The fact that this standard of living was 
higher than that of the Peruvian or Mexican worker may have produced feelings 
of sympathy, but was extremely unlikely to produce a willingness to make 
sacrifices on their own part.  
 
Cuba also had the highest percentage of unionised workers in Latin America at 
the time, but the main federation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba 
(CTC) had become bureaucratised and dependent upon its relationship with the 
government, with most disputes settled by the intervention of the Ministry of 
Labour rather than by collective bargaining. The CTC was headed by General 
Secretary Eusebio Mujal, who, in 1948, had defeated the communists and gained 
control of the trade union machine through a mixture of gangster violence and 
government patronage, was known to be completely corrupt (Rojas Blaquier 
1983). Thereafter, Mujal used his links to government to secure enough 
economic gains for the workers in order to maintain his leadership position and 
to prove that he was at least as effective in this regard as the communists he 
had replaced. Reports from the British Ambassador in 1952 are full of criticism of 
the "endless irresponsible demands of the labour movement" (FO 371/97515 - 
AK1011/1), which he blamed on Mujal who "imposed his will on President Prío 
and secured satisfaction for his every whim, however irresponsible and 
prejudicial to the long term interests of the country it might be"(FO 371/97516 - 
AK1015/33). 
  
The question of low productivity was the principal concern of the 1951 Report on 
Cuba compiled for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 
which the resistance of workers to mechanisation and other productivity 
measures are clearly identified as the main obstacle facing the Cuban economy. 
Francis Truslow, principal author of the report, states: 
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“Employees strongly resist mechanisation and cost-cutting methods. 
‘Featherbedding’ is encouraged and the discharge of employees for 
legitimate cause made difficult or impossible. With labor still making wage 
demands, it is believed that in many cases they have reached the limit 
that employers will tolerate. A movement for the recognition of the fair 
rights of labor has since developed into a pyramid of excesses which 
threatens to liquidate many of the country's productive assets.” (Truslow 
1951) 
 
The IBRD report argues that increased productivity would attract investment, 
promote diversification and thereby produce jobs. Underneath the call for greater 
co-operation between management and labour, based upon changed attitudes, 
lies the concrete proposal to make dismissal of employees simpler, faster and 
cheaper. The per capita income statistics disguise the degree of inequality and 
the chronically high level of unemployment and underemployment. The presence 
of such a large reserve army of the unemployed deeply affected the 
consciousness of those in work and the question of job security was always the 
prime concern of unionised workers. Given the strength of the trade unions, 
there had been little possibility that the Truslow report could be implemented by 
an elected government, but rather required an authoritarian régime to enforce its 
proposals which, at least in the short term, could only result in a considerable 
increase in the already chronic level of unemployment. The army coup that 
brought in the Batista dictatorship was seen as the vehicle for achieving this and 
welcomed by the British Embassy:  
 
“I am more and more convinced that the basic reason for the Armed 
Forces having staged the revolution was their utter disgust at the growing 
and unrestrained power of Labour.” (FO 371/97516/7 - AK1015/33). 
          
Moreover: 
 
“The business community, industry and commerce have all welcomed the 
new régime... If the coup d'état had to come, no better leader could in 
their view have been found and no more opportune moment chosen.” 
(FO371/97516 - AK1015/18). 
 
Faced with the coup, the leadership of the CTC swiftly changed sides and Mujal 
became Batista's most loyal collaborator. In return for his support, the 
government gave the mujalistas generous bribes and obliged employers to 
deduct trade union subscriptions from workers' wages by means of a compulsory 
check-off. These new sources of income for the CTC leadership isolated them 
from rank and file pressure, while the government’s use of its repressive arsenal 
to deny the communists any influence in the trade union movement removed a 
source of competition, winning it support from both Mujal and the British Foreign 
Office. 
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The battleground of organised labour 
 
The 1950s were a period of great tension in the Cold War and the extent of 
communist influence in Cuba was evidently a matter of great concern to the 
Ambassador, as can be seen by his pleasure that the singer Josephine Baker, 
"this hot gospeller of racism, peronism and communism" had fallen foul of the 
military intelligence authorities. The folder of the document in the archives that 
contains these lines, it must be said, contains a hand-written note suggesting 
that "perhaps Mr Holman is being a little severe on Josephine Baker"(FO 
371/103377 - AK1016/1). The embassy staff clearly had a difficult task in sifting 
through the government news releases on the issue of communism, when the 
Batista government, conscious of US views on the subject, were well aware that 
it served their purpose to exaggerate the strength and militancy of the Partido 
Socialista Popular (PSP), as the Cuban communist party was then called. It is 
clear from the tone of the frequent reports on "Communism in Cuba" that British 
diplomats saw through this and, generally speaking, had a fair estimation of the 
relative weakness of Cuban communism in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the Foreign 
Office was warmly appreciative of the repressive anti-communist activity of the 
régime that it credited with keeping the PSP weak. 
 
Much of the Cold War in Latin America was fought on the battleground of 
organised labour. Not only did the anti-communist powers have a firm public ally 
in the International Congress of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and its Latin 
American regional section ORIT, but the British National Archives reveal that they 
had a more confidential ally in the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) who 
supplied the authorities with useful internal information. The ICFTU was 
completely satisfied with the relationship between the CTC and Batista, the 
Foreign Office noting the "refreshing spectacle of an American dictator enjoying 
the support of ICTFU" (FO371/97516 - AK1015/11). Batista moved slowly and 
deliberately, attempting to restore "profitability" by defeating workers sector by 
sector, making sure that the field of battle was chosen by the government while 
any chance of generalised industrial action was avoided. 
 
The first attack came in July 1952, when, with no warning, the government 
placed one of Havana's two bus companies under military control, arrested the 
leader of the union, Marco Hirigoyen and dismissed 600 out of the company's 
6000 drivers. This served the double purpose of removing one of Mujal's internal 
enemies in the CTC and cowing one of the most militant groups of workers in the 
capital, thereby convincing Mujal that his future lay with the regime. It also 
impressed the British Ambassador who reported "this incident as an example of 
what can be achieved in Cuba by a strong man who is fearless of intimidation 
and is bent on cleansing public services of gangster and surplus 
elements"(FO371/97517 - AK1015/38). The trade union bureaucracy accepted 
the banning of the traditional Mayday parade and a period of relative calm 
followed, until Batista had succeeded in giving himself some legitimacy through 
the November 1954 elections, where he was clearly the British preferred 
candidate, being described as "the type of president best suited to the 
country"(FO371/108990 - AK1015/16).  
 
After the elections, the régime faced two pressing problems. The falling price of 
sugar meant that employers were demanding wage and job cuts and were 
particularly insistent as their demands for such cuts the previous year had been 
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largely ignored pending the elections. Additionally, financial problems in the US- 
owned Ferrocarriles Consolidados, the railway company that operated the 
network in the eastern end of the island, meant that the owners of this company 
also wished to cut their wage costs and staff numbers. There was a change of 
Ambassador at this point, and Mr Fordham, the new ambassador who replaced 
Mr Holman nb not identified before, presumably familiarising himself with his 
new posting, does not report very fully on the year 1955, which was a time of 
intense class struggle on the island, referring only to "some labour troubles ... 
none [of which] were resolved satisfactorily". In fact, 1955 started with a railway 
stoppage covering half the island and finishing with a strike by half a million 
sugar workers, while the year also saw militant action by bank workers, 
telephonists, bus drivers, dockers, tobacco rollers, brewers and textile workers. 
Using a mixture of corruption, police violence and a skilful policy of divide and 
rule, the government managed to survive this industrial action, while 
implementing job and wage cuts in most cases. Particularly important was the 
defeat of the sugar workers in December, though many employers did not see it 
that way - according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, having hoped in 
February 1955 that Batista "would override labour opposition" (Economist 
Intelligence Unit: 1955), they expressed disappointment in February of the 
following year saying that "A strike of 500,000 sugar and dock workers was 
settled in the short term by a government decision in favour of the workers" 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1956).  
 
Once regular reports resumed on the internal political situation in 1956,  the only 
real threat perceived to be that of a general strike, as Batistahe "has the backing 
of the Army, big business and the United States"(FO371/126467 - AK1015/1). 
The legal opposition parties posed no threat and were hopelessly divided (Ibarra 
Guitart: 2000), despite the Ambassador's evaluation that they "undoubtedly 
include many of the best elements among the intellectual and professional 
classes" (FO 371/126467 - AK1015/28). Ignoring the widespread police brutality 
and corruption, it was reported that "one is far from having the feeling of living 
in a police state" and that Batista "appears to have the real interests of his 
country at heart"(FO371/126466 - AK1012/2), a view that was to be rudely 
shaken by the arrival on the scene of Fidel Castro at the end of 1956 - although 
it took time for any analysis of the rebel threat to appear in the diplomatic bag.  
 
 
The rebel movement 
 
The Embassy was not alone in failing to predict the threat that Castro and his 
forces might present to the regime and their early 1957 assessment that "recent 
events drawing attention to anti-Batista feelings in the island should not blind us 
to the government's basic strength" (FO 371/126467 - AK1015/8) proved 
accurate, during the initial difficult days for the rebels in the Sierra Maestra. 
Nevertheless, as the year progressed and the rebel army grew in size and 
effectiveness, the diplomatic reports became increasingly concerned that "as long 
as the Cuban government handle affairs as badly as they have done up to now, 
there is little prospect of an improvement". They recognised the 
counterproductive nature of police brutality, accepting that "when terrorism is 
rampant it is not easy to stop the police using unlawful methods" 
(FO371/126467 - AK1015/28).   
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By April 1958, the Vice-Consul in Santiago, for example, was quite clear that, in 
the provinces, the situation was increasingly precarious and that "everyone, rich 
as well as poor, appears to be in favour of Castro"(FO371/132164 - AK1015/20).  
 
It was he who, despite thinking that "the present government has done more for 
Cuba than all previous administrations put together", was clear that "one of the 
reasons that the rebels have enjoyed so much immunity is in the very poor type 
of man in the Cuban army. Being armed, they are living on the fat of the land, 
for every one of them is a grafter and has little inclination to get 
shot"(FO371/132164 - AK1015/28).  An army whose main role is the repression 
of its fellow citizens tends to become corrupt and demoralised. Thus Batista's 
army was not particularly effective in combat when faced with well-trained and 
politically motivated guerrillas who rapidly gained the military upper hand in the 
second half of 1958. Ambassador himself bewailed the fact that "the Army is 
disinclined to undertake heroics" (FO371/132164 - AK1015/44). 
 
Before this rebel military success became apparent, there had been two attempts 
at a general strike to bring down the government:, one in August 1957 following 
the murder of Frank País, leader of the urban resistance in Santiago, which had 
been a success in the east of the island, but had failed to spread westwards to 
the capital;, and a second in April 1958, which was an unmitigated disaster for 
the rebel movement. These failures show the importance of the support given to 
Batista by Mujal and the CTC bureaucracy. Control of the formal trade union 
structures had given the regime a degree of legitimacy in its early days, but 
Mujal's abuse of that control finally made him the second most hated man in 
Cuba after the dictator himself.  His collaboration with the government in 
accepting mechanisation of work practices and other productivity measures, 
along with his failure to secure for the workers the rewards which many of them 
considered to be their share of a moderately prosperous economy, exposed the 
inadequacies of his leadership of the trade unions and won support for the rebels 
amongst ordinary workers. However, that support could not be taken for granted 
and the workers would not support a strike that they could see was suicidal. 
Going on strike in Batista's Cuba could be a life or death decision and workers 
had to feel some confidence in their chances of survival and in the possibilities of 
successfully gaining a result that would be in their political and economic 
interests.  
 
The ambassador frequently refers to the prosperity of Cuba in the 1950s, along 
with a considerable increase in US capital investment. This apparent prosperity 
obscures the effect on individuals and social groups that were left out (Ibarra 
Cuesta 1998). The real question was "prosperity for whom?" Productivity 
increases that had contributed to an increase in profitability were achieved by 
redundancies, increased workloads and longer hours, for the same or lower 
wages. The increase in per capita income, combined with higher in 
unemployment and a static wage for those in work, represented an increase in 
inequality. Workers were acutely aware of how hard they had to work for their 
pay and how easily they might also lose their jobs, when unemployment was 
already running at 20%.,  There was also a moral dimension to the prosperity, as 
a significant part of US investment was in a tourist industry based heavily on 
prostitution and gambling with a high level of Mafia involvement, something not 
reflected in the available diplomatic correspondence (Cirules 1993). 
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Thus, while it might have seemed from the Ambassador's viewpoint that 
"organised labour is enjoying prosperity and privileges such as it had not known 
before" (FO 371/126467 - AK1015/8), many workers in 1958 remembered the 
period before Batista's coup with its shorter working week and higher standard of 
living. The defeat of the major class battles of 1955 came as a signal  that non-
violent trade unionism was no longer a viable option and, if they wanted to resist 
the employers' productivity offensive, they needed armed support. Starting in 
the eastern province of Oriente, the rebel movement managed to build an 
impressive underground workers’ organisation (Comisión Nacional de Historia 
1980), a glimpse of which can be found in the Santiago Vice-Consul's report of a 
trip to Guantanamo. However, the clandestine and regional nature of this 
organisation made it hard to detect in Havana, where Mujal's control of the 
official labour movement appeared secure. 
 
Working class support for the rebels depended on their military success and the 
British government helped undermine this in 1958 by supplying Batista with 
tanks and Sea Fury fighter planes, despite the recognition that "we should not be 
popular if we sold the Cubans Comet tanks"  (FO371/132165 - AK1015/38). The 
predicted unpopularity proved accurate, with the BBC monitoring service picking 
up reports from Radio Rebelde attacking the British for selling war planes at a 
time when even the Americans had declared an arms embargo and calling for a 
boycott of British business, particularly Shell petrol. The US Ambassador, Earl 
Smith, quietly made it clear to the British Ambassador that "he personally hopes 
that we shall continue deliveries of arms to Batista"(FO371/132165 - 
AK1015/62). 
 
However, such political collaboration was not reflected in the commercial field, 
where there was considerable competition and, despite pressure from the US 
Ambassador, who was strenuously pushing a rival bid from the American General 
Motors, a contract was agreed for British Leyland Motors to supply Havana with 
620 new buses. This deal survived the fall of Batista and did much to assuage 
the anger of the incoming rebel government who, found the Sea Fury aircraft still 
in their crates on the Havana docks. 
 
The conventional wisdom of the time -, that power only changed hands in Latin 
America under the control of the army and elite politicians -, collapsed in the 
New Year of 1959 when Fidel Castro called a massively successful general strike 
that prevented the "US Embassy discreetly trying to promote a junta of senior 
officer supporters of Batista and Castro to form a Provisional 
Government"(FO371/132165 - AK1015/77), whilst also gaining complete control 
of the CTC (Alexander: 2002) when, as the diplomatic report would have it: 
"Organised labour jumped on the bandwagon" (FO371/132165 - AK1015/47).  
 
Despite British diplomatic reports that characterised Castro's speech at a CTC 
rally as a "frightening experience", with an allegation that he was using 
"Benzedrine or similar drug"(FO371/132165 - AK1015/59), both sides were 
pragmatic enough to reach an accommodation, perhaps given some urgency by 
the mutual importance of the Leyland bus deal. The Embassy recommended a 
substantial donation to the Salvation Army appeal for the benefit of those who 
suffered in the fighting (FO371/132165 - AK1015/28), while Castro appealed for 
the lifting of the Shell boycott. 
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The British government recognised the new government on January 7th but, in a 
tone that could have come from an embassy report from 1951, we would soon 
start to hear: 
 
"As for labour, I hear on all sides that it is getting completely out of hand 
... it seems that unless productivity is increased and wages held within 
some limits, the national economy will be seriously threatened" 
(FO371/132165 - AK1015/93). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is rare today to see a positive view of the Batista government, but the 
diplomatic reports from Cuba in the 1950s reveal the British government as a 
firm supporter of the dictatorship, which they regarded as serving their 
commercial interests by reducing labour costs, thereby increasing the profitability 
of British investments. At the same time, Batista's exaggerated anti-communism 
fitted well with British foreign policy during the Cold War. Nevertheless, there 
was a central contradiction in the Batista régime. In order to survive and to carry 
out its plan to increase economic productivity, it needed to maintain the support 
of the trade union bureaucracy. Yet if it attacked workers' conditions as quickly 
and as drastically as the employers would have wished, it risked undermining the 
support that Mujal and his fellow trade union leaders could provide. Given the 
chronic divisions within the legal opposition and the unconvincing alternatives 
they presented, the regime could probably have survived were it not for the 
crisis that developed as the uprising in the Sierra Maestra upset the balance. The 
Cuban army's brutal and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to defeat that uprising 
only exacerbated the atmosphere of crisis. Ultimately, the tension between the 
expectations of his supporters and the difficulties in satisfying those expectations 
led to Batista's downfall. However, once their strategy had failed and the regime 
had fallen, the speed with which the Foreign Office came to an accommodation 
with the new government is remarkable, with the successful continuation of the 
Leyland bus agreement and the speedy lifting of the Shell boycott showing their 
ability to hide their political distaste in the greater interest of British commercial 
necessity.  
 
 
Steve Cushion is a doctoral candidate at the Caribbean Studies Centre, London 
Metropolitan University, specialising in Caribbean Labour History. 
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